Thi3 paper deals with the problem of secure cooperative updates for XML documents in distributed systems. In particular, we introduce the basic notions underlying a flow language by using which a user can specify the flow that a given XML document has to follow within a group of cooperating subjects. A key feat'!Jre of the flow language is to be based on the notion of rubject credentials.
Introduction
The exchange of documents on the Web, in partic ular XML documents [5] , in the framework of collab orative and distributed applications [6J involving dif ferent parties, such as subjects belonging to different organizations, requires a proper infrastructure. In par ticular, confidentiality and integrity must be preserved for documents Howing among different parties making also sure that only authorized subjects be able to mod ify the documents. An approach to achieve such goals is based on encrypting the document contents and on generating some special-purpose control information, that are used by a subject to locally check the in tegrity of the document portions for which it possesses at least an authorization [1] . The encrypted document and the corresponding control information form the so called package. Another key requirement, that, up to now, has not been widely investigated, when dealing with distributed and collaborative applications, is the support for the specification of document fl ow policies, that is, policies regulating the set of subjects (hereafter called collabomtive group), that must receive a pack age during the update process. We believe that this is an important requirement since document updates in many organizations must be governed by specific poli cies that reflect the internal rules of the organizations. Many issues need to be addressed for achieving this goal. First, a How policy specification requires the de velopment of a high level specification language. The main features of this language must be the possibil ity of generating totally or partially specified lists of subjects that will have to receive a document in a dis tributed and cooperative update process and the pos sibility of specifying which subjects can extend a flow policy by adding new receivers. We also believe that the language must support flexible ways of qualifying subjects, based on the notion of credentials. S" econdly, the updates to the original document and to the orig inal flow policy must be regulated by proper access control policies and modification control rules, respec tively. These policies and rules must be specified by the subjects, called here and in what follows origi� nators, that have generated the documents and flow policies. Thus, the originators have to specify who can modify which portions of a particular document or flow policy and which privileges can be exercised over them. Finally, a proper infrastructure is required for the decentralized enforcement of the stated policies and rules.
In this paper, we propose an approach to these is sues. Our approach is based on the generation of some control information, that are attached to the docu ment and updated as the document flows, and that make a subject able to locally check the correctness of the path followed by the document till that point and of the modifications performed over it. We first present the language we have developed for specify ing How policies and modification control rules. Then, we present the architecture and relateq protocols that we have developed for supporting distributed and col laborative update processes for XML documents (see Figure 1) . The architecture includes a Parser, that an alyzes the document and the corresponding flow policy. It applies the access control policies to the document, 
A. grouping together the portions to which the same set of access con trol policies apply. Then, it applies the ,modification control rules to the flow policy portions grouping them according to the' set of rules that ap ply to those portions. As a result of this first step we have the package structure containing the docu ment and the flow policy portions grouped according to the above-mentioned strategy. Then, the Encryp tion module, another relevant component of our archi tecture, encrypts the document portions using a dif ferent key for each generated group, for confidentiality purposes. Then, the Control Information Generator generates some control information for, both the doc ument and the flow policy. Finally the encrypted doc ument, the flow policy and all the control information are inserted in the package by the Dispatcher module. This module is also in charge of sending the package to the first chosen subject in the collaborative group. The Recovery module receives recovery requests from the subjects and sends back the last correct version of the received corrupted package. .
Since in a previous paper [2J we have already pre sented an approach to distributed and collabora tive updates of XML documents, in this paper we focus on flow policy management.
The approach we ' present is based on the follow ingassumptions: 1) all the originators are considered trusted; 2) a package can be sent to only one sub-sequent receiver; 3) no loss of messages, that is each message sent to a subject is certainly received.
To the best of our knowledge, the work reported iIi this paper is the first addressing the problem of flow policy management in distributed systems. This work , is part of the Author-X project [3J, whose aim is to provide a comprehensive system for the protection of XML'documents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol lows. Section 2 presents the flow policy modifica tion model on which our approach relies, introduc ing also the flow policy specification language. Sec tion 3 presents the control information required by our approach for the integrity check of the flow pol icy content, whereas Sec tion 4 introduces the informa tion inserted in the package by the subjects that have modified the document/flow policy content. Finally, Section 5 presents the protocols at the originator and receiver sides, whereas Section 6 concludes the paper.
Flow Policy Modification Control
Model '
A modification control model is necessary to spec ify who can modify which portions of a flow policy and how it can do that. Before presenting our flow policy modification control model we need to better intro duce the concept of flow policy. A flow policy contains the sequence of subjects tha.t must receive the package with which it is associated. This sequence can be fully specified in advance, at the beginning of the up date process, or partially specified when the process starts and then modified and extended by authorized subjects. A flow policy attachment does not neces sarily contain the univocally specified list of receivers, but it can contain some receiver specifications, that is, sets of properties that have to be verified by the re ceivers. _ Each-receiver specification can also contain some alternative receiver profiles, specified by using an XML-based language called X-Sec [4] . A receiver is considered legal for a particular receiver specifica tion if it satisfies at least one of the receiver profiles that belong to that specification. Our flow policy spec ification language enables also an originator to grant a receiver the permission of extending a flow policy by inserting·a sub-flow policy. This is supported by associating the value subpath, that enables an inser tion, or nosubpath, that denies an insertion, with a receiver profile. This value is denoted as an extension specification. "
Example 1 An example of flow policy is the follow in g : 8ubpath)}, {nS, (rp4," I/company_director". suhpath)}> which specifies that the first receiver must be a vice manager or a secretary of the "R&D" Depart ment; the second receiver must be a third level accountant; whereas the third receiver must be a company director.
Moreover, the flow policy specifies that whereas vice managers, accountants and company directors are entitled to insert a new sub-policy into this flow policy, secretaries are not enabled to do so. and (rp2, 00 I /secretary (ODepartment="l\1:D"] n. nOllubpath).
0
Our modification control model consists of a set of modification control rules specified in terms of subjects that can modify a flow policy, a privilege that can 1!e exercised by authorized subjects, an object on which the privilege can be exercised, and some propagation op tions, to reduce the number of rules to be specified.
Subjects. In our model subjects are qualified by means of conditions specified against credentials. Fig   ure 2 shows an example of XML credentials specified according to X-Sec [4] . Each subject has one or more 683 credentials, issued by different Certification Author ities (CAs). Conditions specified on credentials are denoted as credential expressions, and are specified by means of an XPath-based language 17].
<vice..manager cid= "50" > <name> <Fname> Jim «Fname> <Iname > Mason </lname> </name> <age> 52 </age> <department> R&D </department> <sarmy> 9,000 <lsalary> <category> Top Executive </category> </vice-1Ilanager> <secretary cid= "12" , vice-1Ilanager;; "50" > <name> <Fname> Alice </Fnarne> <Inarne > Brown </lname> </narne> <age> 38 </age> <department> R&D </department> <sa.lary> 2,000 <jsa.1ary> <level> third </Ievel> <duty> vice_manager secretary </duty> </secretary> Privileges. The privileges supported by our model are delete and update. The first privilege can be ex ercised over one or more receiver specifications or over one or more receiver profiles; whereas the second can be exercised only over the credential expressions that describe the receiver profiles or the extension specifi cations.
Objects. Objects to which a modification control rule applies can be receiver specifications, receiver pro files, credential expressions, and extension specifica tions, according to the privilege specified in the rule, as discussed above.
Propagation options. Finally, our model supports the definition of two I>ropagation options: PROP and NO.PROP. The propagation option PROP causes the ap plication of a rule to the specified object and to all the objects that compose it, whereas NO.PROP causes the application of a rule to the specified object only. The first rule allows vice_manager Jim (see Figure 2) to delete the receiver profile contained in the second re ceiver specification, whereas the second rule allows the same subject to update the credential expression and the extension specification associated with the receiver profile contained in the third receiver specification. 0 3
Flow Policy Control Information
To correctly enforce the modification of the flow policy portions and to allow a receiver to locally check the integri ty of those portions, we need to associate with a flow policy some control information, referred to as flow policy attachment. Flow policy portions are grouped together according to the set of rules that ap ply to them forming some regions. All the flow policy portions to which no rule applies belong to a unique non-modifiable region, whereas the other p ortions be long to modifiable regions. Control information associ ated with the non-modifiable region consists of a hash value computed over all the flow policy portions that belong to that region. To protect the authenticity of this information the Bow policy's originator encrypts this hash value with its private key.
Before presenting the control information associ ated with modifiable regions we have to introduce the concept of flow policy modification certificate. A flow po l icy modification certificate is generated by the flow policy ' s originator according to the rules in 1V;. Given a modification control rule mcr belonging to 'RB and a subject sbj to which mcr applies a flow policy modi fication certificate, generated for sbj according to mer, cont ains the following information: the sbfs public key.
(sbj-pubkey), the privilege contained in mcr (priv), and the set of regions and corresponding flow policy portions, to which mer applies. Each certificate is signed by the flow policy's originator with its private key for authentication purpose and distribuWd to the subject to which it belongs to. has updated an updatable region ur on the flow policy portions belonging to ur itself and inserted in the flow policy attachment. A modifiable region also contains a set of flow policy modification certificates used by the subsequent receivers t o verify that the modifications executed till that point over the region are correct wrt the specified policies and rules.
Receiver Declarati.ons
A subject that has received a package can exercise on the document and/or on the flow policy portions the privileges contained in the document/flow policy modification certificates thai. it has received by the originators. The jt h receiver of a package' must sat isfy the jtk receiver specificat;ion in the flow policy to be a valid receiver. To allow subsequent receivers to check that it is really a valid ph receiver, it has to insert within the ph receiver specification rs one of its credentials that satisfies at least one of the creden tial expressions associated with the alternative receiver profiles belonging to rs. Moreover, it has to specify the identity of the next receiver. Finally, it can also insert two types of declarations within rs: a document modification declaration and/or a flow policy modifica tion declaration. The former declaration contains the list of all modification operations executed over doc ument portions. Each declared operation is given in terms of the executed privilege and list of modified document portions. A corresponding certificate must be inserted in the modified region in the proper region contr o l component. The latter declaration is similar to the former one, indeed also in this case it contains the list of modification operations executed over the fl ow policy. A corresponding flow policy modification cer tificate must be inserted in the proper region. Before sending the updated package to the next receiver it has also to sign the whole rs's content for authentication and integrity purposes. All the declarations stored in the flow policy form the so called modification history of both the document and the flow policy.
To prevent a subject sbj t;hat has received several times the same package from sending an old package version to another subject, ear.h receiver sends its cur rent version of the flow policy attachment to all the other subjects involved in the, distributed and collab orative update process.
Example 3 Figure 9 shows the package received by the first subject involved in a distribut ed and collab orative process and the updated package sent by this subject to the subsequent one. In particular, the first subject deletes a receiver profile belonging to the third receiver specification, according to the flow policy mod ification certifirote (fpmc1) that it has received by the proper flow policy originator. It also inserts in the flow policy attachment the required information before signing the content of its ,corresponding receiver spec ification (i.e., the first one) and then it inserts in the package the used certificate ill the proper flow policy region (fpaR2). 
